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Abstract
One of the debates often encountered by native southerners centers around our 
historical symbols.  There are heated opinions on both sides of the issue as to what 
these symbols mean and whether they should be allowed to be displayed. The latter 
question has begun making its way into the courts, with many southern symbols 
and memorials being accused of promoting the philosophy of racial supremacy.
Despite the growing public concern, modern courts refuse to rule on the question.
They claim they are forestalled by Article III’s standing requirement that plaintiffs 
must have suffered a concrete injury in fact.  They state that merely asserting offense
at a message does not meet this requirement, even if the message is offered by the 
Government. In this article, I show that holding to be incorrect.
The Constitution provides certain absolute rights that the government may not 
infringe upon. One of those rights is the right to be free from slavery, which the 
courts have expanded to include all of its badges and incidents. Though courts have 
gone back and forth on what constitutes a badge of slavery, a historical look at the 
Thirteenth Amendment shows that amongst the things the drafters intended the 
definition to include was the philosophical message of racial supremacy if it is 
communicated by the government. In my article, I demonstrate that the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment includes a ban on the governmental endorsement of racial 
supremacy, including endorsements made in the form of symbols. I show that mere 
exposure to such a message is the unique form of injury that a violation of that right 
creates and, as such, is a concrete harm on which Article III standing can be based. 
Finally, I provide a workable test for determining whether a particular exposure to a 
symbol of racial superiority possesses all the elements necessary to constitute an 
injury in fact for the purposes of standing.
I. Introduction: The Case of Moore v. Bryant
Close to the time of its founding, the fictitious town of South Park, 
Colorado voted on the new town’s flag.1 The locals decided on a design 
featuring a dark yellow field with four cheering White human figures 
gathered around a gallows on which a Black figure was hanging by his 
neck.2 Later generations would call for its change, stating that such a 
symbol sends a strikingly clear message to the viewer: the town govern-
ment favors racial supremacy.3 It condones the right of the White race to 
1. Trey Parker, South Park: Chef Goes Nanners (Comedy Central television broadcast 
July 5, 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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treat the Black race any way it sees fit and communicates that the city 
government still harbors and endorses at least one of the elements that led 
to and maintained the institution of American slavery.4 Many people 
would like to believe this is a simple work of fiction; nothing more than 
a satirization of the debate between heritage and hate that could never 
actually happen in the United States of America. Unfortunately, these 
people may be wrong.
In 2001, voters in the State of Mississippi were presented with the 
question of what the visual composition of their State flag would be.5
They decided to maintain the 1894 design, which featured three hori-
zontal bars of blue, white, and red, as well as a depiction of the Battle 
Flag of the Army of Northern Virginia (commonly referred to as the 
“Confederate Battle Flag” or the “Confederate Flag”)6 prominently 
placed in the upper left corner.7 To many voters, the design represented 
the history of their State and a pride in their Southern culture and way of 
life.8 However, for others it was a reference to a dark period in American 
history when the Government not only tolerated but also actively en-
dorsed the institutions of white supremacy and human slavery.9 Carlos 
Moore was of the latter opinion.
Mr. Moore was an African American citizen of Mississippi who 
claimed his family line traced back to slaves of the American south.10
Since Mississippi State law called for the display of the State flag in front 
of all public buildings,11 Moore was consistently exposed to it and its per-
ceived message – both as a private citizen and due to his employment as 
an attorney, as a local professional.12 He found it difficult to conduct his 
professional and personal life and began suffering increased anxiety due to 
the constant reminder that his State favored a social construct in which 
he was considered, at best, a second-class citizen.13 More concerning for 
him was the flag’s effect on his daughter, a school-aged child who would 
be taught to honor and compelled to pledge allegiance to a perceived 
4. Id.
5. 2001 Miss. ALS 301, 2001 Miss. Laws 301, 2001 Miss. H.B. 524.
6. Thomas G. Clemens, Confederate Battle Flag, ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA (Sept. 7, 
2016), https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Confederate_Battle_Flag.
7. Miss. Code Ann. § 3-3-16.
8. Josh Sanburn, Why Mississippi is Unlikely to Redesign Its State Flag, TIME (July 7, 
2018), http://time.com/3932807/mississippi-state-flag/.
9. Id.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017) 
cert. denied, 2017 U.S. Lexis 7027 (No. 17-23), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2319.
11. Miss. Code Ann. § 3-3-15.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017) 
cert. denied, 2017 U.S. Lexis 7027 (No. 17-23), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2319.
13. Id. at 11-12.
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symbol of her subjugation.14 Since the flag was the result of a public vote,
there was no aid for him in the halls of his State legislature or executive 
offices, so he went to the courts for relief from the message. Unfortu-
nately, no comfort was to be found there either.
Judge Reeves of the United States District Court for the Northern 
Division of the Southern District of Mississippi gave an impassioned re-
sponse to Moore’s position.15 In an eleven-page analysis, Judge Reeves 
tracked the use of the Confederate Battle Flag from its origins in the 
Confederacy through its usurpation by modern hate groups.16 In his writ-
ten opinion, he emphasized that the purpose of the symbol as adopted by 
Mississippi was to tell the rest of the Union that Mississippi continued to 
believe that the Black race was not equal to the White race, and that the 
State refused to acknowledge otherwise.17 In essence, he concluded, it 
was the same type of sentiment that had contributed in part to the insti-
tution of slavery, the War for Southern Independence, and the civil un-
rest that followed.18 Despite his apparent agreement with Moore’s posi-
tion, Judge Reeves then slammed closed the doors of the courthouse.
While Judge Reeves felt that Moore’s argument was factually cor-
rect, Moore had failed in one key legal aspect: he had not shown himself 
to have standing to bring his case.19 Judge Reeves held that the injury 
Moore complained of, a physical ailment due to the stigmatic unequal 
treatment of his race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, was not 
sufficient to establish standing (in other words Moore’s right to be heard 
in court).20 The Supreme Court decided in Allen v. Wright that mere dis-
crimination was not a sufficient injury under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.21 The discrimination must be accompanied by a particularized, tan-
gible injury to the individual resulting from the challenged action.22 Since 
Moore could only point to generalized injuries, none of which constitut-
ed an act of discrimination against him or demonstrated some form of 
unequal treatment, he had no personal grounds on which to challenge 
the flag. Though Moore also complained of a violation of his Thirteenth 
Amendment right, Reeves dismissed this argument in a footnote, stating
that Congress had not passed any statute or resolution addressing or de-
14. Id. at 12.
15. Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 838-49 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 856.
20. Id.
21. 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 852-53 (S.D. 
Miss. 2016).
22. Moore, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 852-53.
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fining the Confederate Battle Flag as a badge of slavery and therefore, it 
was not a violation.23
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Reeves’s conclusion re-
garding standing.24 Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge 
Higginson emphasized that mere exposure to an offensive message, even 
one spoken by the government, is not a sufficient injury to grant standing 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
Simply stated, since Moore could not demonstrate some personalized,
concrete injury resulting from an act of discrimination conducted in re-
sponse to the flag, the federal courts had no grounds to hear his case. In 
his appeal, Moore dropped the Thirteenth Amendment complaint and
the Fifth Circuit did not refer to it.26
Later that year, Moore filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.27
At first, it appeared the Court intended to hear the case, which would 
have served as an opinion of first impression on the question of standing 
with regard to racial symbols. The Court ordered extended time for the 
submission of briefs and requested a brief from the State of Mississippi, 
which had previously waived its right to provide one.28 Then, without 
providing explanation, the Court denied the petition.29 Just like that, the
issue was closed.
Regrettably, the courts and Moore’s legal team failed to see the true 
nature of the case and what injury the flag may have been producing.
Neither party properly applied the Thirteenth Amendment to a situation 
it was designed to address. Specifically, if the Confederate Battle Flag was 
indeed offered as a symbol of the State’s endorsement of the philosophy 
of racial superiority as it existed under the institution of U.S. slavery, then 
the flag was conveying a message that the United States Constitution spe-
cifically forbade the government from expressing. The injury was the ex-
posure to that message. The proper course of action should have been an 
examination of that symbol in court.
In this article, I will start by examining the Thirteenth Amendment 
and demonstrate that part of its intended purpose was to forbid the gov-
ernmental endorsement of racial supremacy. I will then show how expo-
23. Id. at 858 n.118.
24. Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017) cert. 
denied, 2017 U.S. Lexis 7027 (No. 17-23), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2319.
28. U.S Supreme Court Docket Files, Moore v. Bryant, No. 17-23,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/
17-23.html.
29. Moore v. Bryant, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017).
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sure to such a message alone is a sufficient injury to establish standing un-
der Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
II. Article III Standing and the Badges of Slavery
A. The Elements of Standing
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, for a party to 
bring an action in federal court, they must have a personal case or con-
troversy.30 This has been interpreted as meaning that a party must (1) 
have suffered an “injury in fact” (2) that is “actual or imminent, not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” (3) which is traceable to the challenged 
actions of the defendant, and (4) which is likely to be redressed by a fa-
vorable decision.31 The injury in fact must be particularized, meaning that 
a plaintiff must show that they personally have a legally protected interest 
that was violated by the actions of the defendant.32 The injury must be 
concrete, meaning that it may not be a mere “psychological consequence 
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disa-
grees.”33 However, this does not mean that the term is limited to tangible 
injuries only.34
When faced with an intangible injury, the courts may determine 
that standing exists if history and the judgment of Congress point to the 
intangible harm as being one that traditionally provided standing under 
U.S. or English law, such as the violation of an absolute and protected 
right.35 If the Constitution creates an absolute right and if a person is de-
prived of that right, then an injury has occurred regardless of whether 
there is any other effect.36 One such right, as will be shown below, is the 
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
32. Id. See also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
33. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).
34. Spokeo, Inc. 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to 
recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can 
nevertheless be concrete.”); U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 686 (1962) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (“In interpreting ‘injury in fact’ we made it clear that standing was not confined 
to those who could show “economic harm””. . .).
35. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
36. See Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our con-
temporary decisions have not required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury beyond the vio-
lation of his personal legal rights to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement.”); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (unanimously holding that the deprivation of an abso-
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right to be free of the badge of slavery that results from the government’s 
endorsement of the message of racial supremacy.37 A plaintiff need not 
meet the elements of standing with definitive proof in order to be heard 
in court; they need only be able to make “general factual allegations of 
injury.”38 Naturally, there will always exist the requirement that the alle-
gations are true and provable at trial.39
B. Courts Have the Power to Determine for Themselves What the
Badges of Slavery Are
An area of contention in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence is 
whether the courts have the power to determine, without an act of Con-
gress, whether a specific indicator constitutes a badge of slavery. Nearly 
every decision the Supreme Court has made regarding the Thirteenth 
Amendment refers to Congress’ power to create laws under the Amend-
ment.40 This, however, does not mean that the courts have found such 
power to belong purely to the legislative branch.
Justice Brewer stated that “[t]his amendment denounces a status or 
condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is creat-
ed.”41 Though the Court has never explicitly declared something to be a 
badge of slavery, it has indicated that the courts possess such an ability. 
The Thirteenth Amendment has been held as self-executing, which 
means it does not require an act of Congress to be implemented.42
Though Congress has broad power under the second clause of the 
Amendment, that power is meant only to facilitate enforcement. 43 The
lute constitutional right, such as due process, is an injury for the purposes of standing even 
if no other cognizable injury exists. “Even if respondents’ suspensions were justified, and 
even if they did not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that they were de-
prived of their right to procedural due process.”).
37. See infra II.B.
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
39. Baker, 369 U.S. at 688–89.
40. Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409, 440 (“Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment ration-
ally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery. . .”); Hodges v. U.S.,
203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906); U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
41. Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
42. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981); Stanley, 109 U.S. at 20 (“This 
amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancil-
lary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances.”).
43. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128–29 (“[C]ongress may only “enforce” the provisions of the 
amendments and may do so only by “appropriate legislation.” Congress has no power 
under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments’ guarantees of personal 
equality and freedom from discrimination, or to undermine those protections of the Bill 
FALL 2019] Symbolism and the Thirteenth Amendment 87
amendment itself was meant to provide rights that Congress does not 
have any power to limit by refusing to legislate them into being. Simply 
stated, just because Congress has not declared something to be a badge of 
slavery does not mean that it isn’t or that the Courts are forestalled from 
making such a determination.
Still, this is not without some contention. In Palmer v. Thompson,
the Supreme Court held that a municipality’s decision to close public 
swimming pools rather than integrate them was not a violation of the 
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment because the statute was neutral on
its face and in its effect.44 When discussing the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Justice Black, who a year earlier in Oregon v. Mitchell seemed to agree 
with the Court’s power to determine the badges,45 held that the refusal to 
allow Blacks and Whites to swim in the same public pool was not a 
badge of slavery because Congress had not passed a law regulating pools.46
He stated: “[e]stablishing this Court’s authority under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and 
cities of the country would grant it a lawmaking power far beyond the 
imagination of the amendment’s authors.”47 While this position has never 
been directly overturned, neither the Supreme Court nor any other fed-
eral court has cited Palmer in support of it. Further, the Court indicated
in later opinions that the courts retained the power to define a badge of 
slavery.48 Even the example case of Moore does not point to Palmer or any 
Supreme Court case asserting that the courts may not determine what is a 
badge of slavery.49 There, Judge Reeves cited two Fifth Circuit cases that 
held that Congress has the power to define the badges, but neither case 
directly stated the power was Congress’ alone.50
From the holdings of the Court, it is clear that while Congress has 
the power to define the badges of slavery, it is not a power granted to 
them alone. The Court need not refrain from hearing a case purely be-
cause the harm is rooted in a symbol not addressed by Congress.51 In fact, 
of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the 
States.”) (citation omitted).
44. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–26 (1971).
45. See Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128–29 (1970).
46. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226–27.
47. Id.
48. See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
49. See Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
50. See id.; see also Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989); see also U.S. v. 
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
51. See Memphis, 451 U.S. 100 (holding that the closing of a road leading from a black 
neighborhood into a white one was not a badge of slavery without stating a requirement 
that Congress have previously legislated it as such); see also id. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissent-
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if the threat to the rights protected is truly one of great social concern, it 
may be argued that the courts not only have the power, but also the duty 
to make such a determination.52
C. Defining the Badges of Slavery
Before it can be established that freedom from governmental en-
dorsement of racial supremacy is a right under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, how the Amendment has been interpreted and what it was meant 
to encompass must be examined. When interpreting any Constitutional 
provision, especially one that is a direct result of significant historical 
events, it is important to consider what the provision meant to the coun-
try at the time it was written.53
Following the War for Southern Independence, the nation was 
faced with the question of how to prevent the evils it perceived as caus-
ing the conflict. Most pressing was the issue of the freed slaves in the 
South, and what their status would be moving forward. Despite the fact 
that they had been liberated through war and proclamation,54 the Consti-
tution itself did not recognize them as citizens or assign them a right to 
be free.55 To remedy this, in 1865 the States ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.56 Its wording was plain “Neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
ing) (“[I]t defies the lessons of history and law to assert that if the harm is only symbolic, 
then the federal courts cannot recognize it).
52. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that the question of gay 
marriage, though on its face a political question, was a proper one for the courts to an-
swer due to the immediate and large damage being inflicted on citizen’s rights while wait-
ing for the legislature to act).
53. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (argu-
ing that the proper interpretation of the Constitution and its Amendments requires a 
study of the wording of the text and the “immersing [of] oneself in the political and intel-
lectual atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have 
which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and 
loyalties that are not those of our day” adulterated with the stare decisis of the provision); 
see also Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The lan-
guage of the First Amendment is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but 
as symbols of historic experience illuminated by the presuppositions of those who em-
ployed them. . . . As in the case of every other provision of the Constitution that is not 
crystalized by the nature of its technical concepts.”)
54. Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in 12 Stat. App. 1268.
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56. 13th Amendment, THE HISTORY CHANNEL, https://www.history.com/topics/
black-history/thirteenth-amendment.
FALL 2019] Symbolism and the Thirteenth Amendment 89
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”57 Yet, seemingly before the ink 
of the words was dry, their exact meaning became nothing short of a 
complicated debate.
On its surface, the meaning of the amendment seems straightfor-
ward. The literal action of enslaving another person is forbidden.58 How-
ever, early in the amendment’s history the Court read more into those 
words than plain liberty.59 Justice Bradley famously wrote that the 
Amendment did not just bar the actual act of slavery, but also all of its 
“badges and incidents.”60 He held that the Thirteenth Amendment was 
not merely aimed at laws allowing slavery or even just at the actual act of 
enslavement, it also had a “reflexive character . . . establishing and de-
creeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United 
States.”61 This reflective character empowered the Amendment to not 
just ban slavery itself, but also all of its elements and indicators.62
The question remained of how exactly to define these badges and 
incidents. The Congressional debates around the ratification offered no 
clarification. Many Congressmen of the time argued that their intention 
in proposing and voting on the Amendment was simply to free the black 
man, nothing more.63 Others argued that nothing short of true racial 
equality was the mission of the Amendment.64 Senator Harlan, for exam-
ple, argued that the removal of slavery also meant the removal of all of its 
incidents, meaning there should be no right provided to a citizen essential 
for the condition of freedom that was denied because of a person’s race.65
The only point of agreement was that the state of forced servitude was to 
be banned.
The most telltale evidence of the interpreted meaning of the 
Amendment is the concept of a “badge” of slavery.66 The Oxford dic-
tionary defines “badge” as “a feature or sign which reveals a particular 
57. U.S. CONST., amend, XIII, § 1.
58. Hodges v. U.S., 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (Brewer, J.), overruled in part by Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), (“The things denounced are slavery and invol-
untary servitude, and Congress is given power to enforce that denunciation. All under-
stand by these terms a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another.”).
59. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1465 (1864) (Sen. Henderson ar-
gued that the effect of the proposed amendment was to free the black slaves, not to make 
them equal to white men).
64. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1438-40 (1864).
65. Id.
66. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (Swayne, J.) 
(equating the badges of slavery with the incidents of slavery).
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quality.”67 At its core, therefore, prohibiting the badges of slavery in-
cludes the barring of any feature or sign that would reveal the status of
slavery in a person. The nature of these features or signs of slavery went 
through a transition during the period of ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.68 Prior to its passing, many considered a “badge of slavery”
to be the color of a man’s skin or some other physical indication that, in
the eyes of society and the law, he was inferior.69 Since the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment removed the color of a man’s skin as an indica-
tor, many began to see the term as referring to legal restrictions placed on 
the civil rights of a citizen due to his race.70 Looking at both meaning and 
history, it becomes clear that the focus of the Amendment, at a mini-
mum, was to remove not only slavery itself but also any indicator –
physical or civic – that the person was considered a slave. Since the Thir-
teenth Amendment is applicable against all actors, state and private, this 
bar on the indicators of slavery applies equally to all level of govern-
ment.71
When the Supreme Court heard The Civil Rights Cases, it seemed 
ready to venture into this quagmire of a definition. Instead of elaborating 
on the term, however, Justice Bradley unsuccessfully sought to confine it.
While declaring that the Thirteenth Amendment bans more than the act 
of enslavement, he also carefully explained that the goal of the Thirteenth 
Amendment was not to create equal citizenry.72 He wrote that the pur-
pose was only to emancipate the former slaves to the same extent as the 
Black men of the Northern States.73 Justice Bradley discussed how the 
envisioned Amendment was intended to make Blacks of the south the 
same as their northern brethren.74 At the time, Black citizens of the north 
were free but did not enjoy all of the rights of the White men.75 Since a 
person in such a state of second-class citizenship76 was considered a 
67. Badge, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/badge
(last visited July 10, 2018).
68. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 561, 581 (2012).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, n.1 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing).
72. See U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
73. Id. at 24 (“It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it 
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make.”).
74. See id. at 25.
75. Id. at 25.
76. The Oxford Dictionary defines second-class citizen as, “[a] person belonging to a 
social or political group whose rights and opportunities are inferior to those of the domi-
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freedman that must have been what was intended by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.77
After The Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court has never offered a 
clear definition or test for the term. At times the Supreme Court has en-
dorsed a narrow meaning, confining the term to the literal, physical 
bondages of slavery, while at other times it seemed to be holding the 
door wide open for a broad interpretation.78
The modern precedent for the definition of “badges of slavery”
comes from Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, in which the Court held 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1968 barred racial discrimination in the sell-
ing of private as well as public property.79 Though Justice Stewart never 
directly defined the term, he strongly indicated that it meant more than 
mere physical freedom.80 He held that it at least meant that all races had 
the freedom to enjoy the same civil rights, in that case specifically the 
right to purchase property.81 Though vague, his holding implies that the
Court considers section one of the Thirteenth Amendment to go beyond 
physical liberty. At the same time, the Court directly overruled Hodges v. 
United States, which had called for a narrow definition of the term.82
Modern legal scholars continue to debate what the badges are and 
specifically how to identify them.83 The test that is gaining the strongest 
footing in modern courts seems to be the one proposed by Associate Pro-
fessor McAward of the University of Notre Dame Law School. After a 
nant group in society.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/second-class_citizen (last accessed July 9, 2018).
77. See Stanley, 109 U.S. at 25.
78. Compare Hodges v. U.S., 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (“The things denounced are slav-
ery and involuntary servitude, and Congress is given power to enforce that denunciation. 
All understand by these terms a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to an-
other.”), with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 411 (1968) (“For this Court 
recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed, the badges and inci-
dents of slavery—its burdens and disabilities—included restraints upon those fundamental 
rights which are the essence of civil freedom.”) (quotation removed).
79. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
80. Id. at 440–43.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 441 n.78.
83. See James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and Inci-
dents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426, 468 (2018) (arguing that the proper test was one 
that looked to whether the group targeted was of African American descent and asked 
whether there was some connection between the injury and “law, practice, or experi-
ence” of slavery); see also Herman N. Johnson Jr., From Status to Agency: Abolishing the 
“Very Spirit of Slavery”, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 245, 256 (2017) (claiming that “the Thir-
teenth Amendment provides a constitutional foundation for laws that combat implicit bias 
and hidden discrimination because it serves to transform persons from a status of bondage 
to the relative freedom of individual agency”).
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lengthy exploration of the history of the term, she stated that, “[i]n its 
most general sense, the term ‘badge of slavery’ therefore refers to indica-
tors, physical or otherwise, of African Americans’ slave or subordinate 
status.”84 Accordingly, the proper test looks to whether the challenged 
indicator is one that was traditionally associated with a slave or subordi-
nate status and whether its allowance has significant potential to lead to 
the de facto re-enslavement or legal subjugation of the targeted group.85
Due to this test reflecting the base line concerns of the drafters of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the federal courts are embracing it more and 
more.86
The central theme that can be taken from all of these definitions 
and tests is that, if nothing else, the Thirteenth Amendment was intended 
not just to ban the physical act of slavery. Its purpose was to also ban all 
of slavery’s individual elements that would have the effect of indicating 
that the targeted person is of a subjugated race and whose allowance 
could lead to the de facto subjugation of that race.
D. Racial Supremacy v. Racial Discrimination
It is important to note here that what is being discussed is the mes-
sage of racial supremacy, not racial discrimination. While this may seem 
like splitting a fine hair, it is an important distinction for the purposes of 
Thirteenth Amendment analysis. Webster’s Dictionary defines “suprema-
cy” as “the quality or state of having more power, authority, or status 
than anyone else.”87 It defines “discrimination” as “the practice of unfair-
ly treating a person or group of people differently from other people or 
groups of people.”88 Racial supremacy has to do with an actual state of 
existence, specifically that one’s state is superior to another’s because of 
race. Discrimination deals not with a state of existence, but rather with a 
method of treatment. Looking at the content and effect of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendment, this distinction appears to have been in the 
84. McAward, supra note 68, at 575.
85. Id.
86. See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying the 
McAward test directly); United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citing McAward repeatedly); United States v. Metcalf, No. 15-CR-1032-LRR, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25950, at *8 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 2, 2016) (quoting McAward).
87. Supremacy (English Language Learners Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supremacy.
88. Discrimination (English Language Learners Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discrimination.
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minds of the drafters.89 The Thirteenth Amendment deals specifically
with a state of existence—that of freeman versus slave—while the Four-
teenth aims specifically at methods of treatment under the law.90
The Court has spoken very clearly about standing under the Four-
teenth Amendment.91 It has held that for a person to have standing the
claimed injury must not be merely stigmatic; there must be an accompa-
nying tangible unequal treatment.92 This approach is not being challenged 
here and makes logical sense, considering the subject matter of the 
Amendment. Naturally, an Amendment meant to forestall unequal treat-
ment may not be violated unless someone has suffered an injury resulting 
from unequal treatment.93 This must logically differ, however, from an 
Amendment meant to prevent a state of existence. What the Thirteenth 
Amendment aims at is the institution of slavery as a whole, including the 
elements necessary for its existence.94 The concern is not the harm of be-
ing unequally treated, but the promotion of the existence of the institu-
tion.
When deciding which amendment to apply to a particular case, this 
distinction is remarkably important, and it reflects the mistake made by 
89. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“Mere discriminations on account 
of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
91. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984); see also Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 
245, 249 (5th Cir. 2017).
92. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755; Moore, 853 F.3d at 249.
93. The mere fact that a person is being mistreated should not be enough because 
there is almost no logical way to draft a statute that doesn’t treat somebody differently 
from society as a whole, making a harm necessary.
94. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24 (“The Thirteenth Amendment has respect, 
not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery.”); Clyatt v. United States, 197 
U.S. 207, 216 (1905) (“This amendment denounces a status or condition, irrespective of 
the manner or authority by which it is created.”); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 
33 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Congress had power, under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, not only to forbid the existence of peonage, but to make it an offense against the 
United States for any person to hold, arrest, return or cause to be held, arrested or re-
turned, or who in any manner aided in the arrest or return of another person, to a condi-
tion of peonage.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711 (C.C.D. La. 1874) 
(No. 14, 1897), aff’d, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (“This is not merely a prohibition against the 
passage or enforcement of any law inflicting or establishing slavery or involuntary servi-
tude, but it is a positive declaration that slavery shall not exist. It prohibits the thing.”); see 
also Pope, supra note 84, at 440 (“‘Slavery’ often signified the system of slavery, conceived 
as an interlocking set of components, raising the possibility that the eradication of slavery 
would entail eliminating not only chattelism and physically or legally coerced labor, but 
also other important components of the system.”).
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the parties and courts in Moore. If what is being questioned is the treat-
ment of the individual under the law, then the Fourteenth Amendment is 
proper. However, if, as in Moore, what is being challenged is whether an 
action changes the status of a person to, or endorses a person as, a sec-
ond-class citizen in the eyes of the government, then the Thirteenth
Amendment and its rulings must be applied.
E. The Message of Racial Supremacy Was Always Considered a 
Badge of Slavery
In 1874, less than a decade after the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and nine years before he would write the majority opinion 
for The Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley, then a circuit judge for the 
District of Louisiana, heard a case regarding criminal charges against a 
group of White men who intimidated and falsely held a group of Black 
men in order to prevent them from voting. Regarding the scope of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, he wrote:
It was supposed that the eradication of slavery and involuntary 
servitude of every form and description required that the slave 
should be made a citizen and placed on an entire equality be-
fore the law with the white citizen, and, therefore, that con-
gress had the power, under the amendment, to declare and ef-
fectuate these objects. The form of doing this, by extending 
the right of citizenship and equality before the law to persons 
of every race and color . . . was necessary for the purpose of 
settling a point which had been raised by eminent authority, 
that none but the white race were entitled to the rights of citi-
zenship in this country. As disability to be a citizen and enjoy 
equal rights was deemed one form or badge of servitude, it 
was supposed that congress had the power, under the amend-
ment, to settle this point of doubt, and place the other races 
on the same plane of privilege as that occupied by the white 
race.95
Bradley’s writing reflects almost word for word the charge of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866—which declared all people born in the United States 
to be equal citizens and prescribed penalties for their subjugation.96 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 is unique  in that it was written by a majority of 
the Congressmen who had drafted the Thirteenth Amendment, and it 
95. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 711.
96. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1981-1986 (1991)).
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was passed prior to the passage and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.97 It demonstrates the intentions of the drafters of the Thir-
teenth Amendment clearly, because it was in no way influenced by the 
parallel charges of the Fourteenth.98 What is clear from the Amendment 
itself as well as the writing of the courts at the time is that the intention 
of the Thirteenth Amendment was not merely the ending of literal slav-
ery, but also an ending to those elements that allowed the institution of 
slavery to exist. Right away, the philosophy of racial supremacy was 
identified as one such element.99
Racial supremacy and American slavery went hand in hand almost 
from the beginning, though there is debate on which came first.100 The 
foundation of the moral acceptance of American slavery was the belief 
that the enslaved race was so inferior to the enslaving race that its subju-
gation was not only morally correct, it was a natural state that benefited 
the enslaved.101 This sentiment was even upheld by the Supreme Court 
itself where, in perhaps the Court’s most infamous decision, Chief Justice 
Taney wrote:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as be-
ings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully 
be reduced to slavery for his benefit. . . . This opinion was at 
that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the 
white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in 
politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be 
open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in socie-
ty daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, 
as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a 
moment the correctness of this opinion.102
Further proof of this mentality can be found in a report from General 
Carl Schurz to the President of the United States from the time between 
97. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
98. Id.; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968).
99. See Civil Rights Act of 1855, 14 Stat. 27.
100. Compare Michael Minkoff, Jr., American Slavery and Racism, LAST RESISTANCE (May 
29, 2018 12:42 pm), https://lastresistance.com/american-slavery-and-racism/ with John 
Mark N. Reynolds, Historical Parochialism: American Slavery Is Not Ancient Slavery,
PATHEOS (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/philosophicalfragments/
2013/12/05/historical-parochialism-american-slavery-is-not-ancient-slavery.
101. Minkoff, supra note 100; Reynolds, supra note 100.
102. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
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the end of the War for Southern Independence and the passing of the 
Civil Rights Act. General Schurz was tasked by President Johnson to 
travel the former Confederacy and ascertain, inter alia, the condition of 
the freed blacks. Schurz found that their condition was one in need of 
dire attention.103 He reported that the Southerners had not abandoned 
their supremacy views and were working to return the freed slaves to a 
state of subjugation.104 The report ended with the warning, “[a]s to the 
future peace and harmony of the Union, it is of the highest importance 
that the people lately in rebellion be not permitted to build up another 
‘peculiar institution’ whose spirit is in conflict with the fundamental prin-
ciples of our political system . . . .”105 This sentiment would later be ech-
oed on the Senate floor in support of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.106
Since Justice Taney’s sentiments and General Schurz report reflect
the prevalent beliefs of the time, they surely were in the minds of the
drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment. In attempting to eliminate slav-
ery, the drafters were looking not just to forced servitude itself, but also 
to the philosophies that had enabled its past and future existence. This in-
cluded the belief on the part of the governing body that the White race 
was superior and therefore justified in subjugating Black people. Justice 
Bradley would later reflect this in The Civil Rights Cases where he wrote:
Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 
passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before the 
Fourteenth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens 
and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting 
its substance and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of eve-
ry race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, 
those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil free-
dom . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”107
This core belief is emulated in modern rulings as well. In Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Company, Justice Douglas writing in concurrence observed, 
“The true curse of slavery is not what it did to the black man, but what it 
has done to the white man. For the existence of the institution produced 
103. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 20 (1st Sess. 1865); see also City of Memphis v. 
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 131 n.4 (1981) (White, J., concurring); Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46, 109 n.3 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
104. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 17.
105. Id. at 46.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1865); see also Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 194-96 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 462 n.28 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).
107. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added).
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the notion that the white man was of superior character, intelligence, and 
morality. . . . While the institution has been outlawed, it has remained in 
the minds and hearts of many white men.”108 Ultimately, the goal of 
Congress in creating the Thirteenth Amendment was not mere freedom, 
but the establishment of the Black race as equal citizens in status to the 
White.109 Any indication that the government considers the Black man to 
have a different status of citizenship from the White would be a continu-
ance of a substance of slavery, which is banned by the Constitution.
Finally, when the McAward test is applied110, it shows that racial su-
premacy ought to be considered a badge of slavery. It has already been 
demonstrated that history considers racial supremacy to be an element of 
the American slave system. But could its allowance lead to the de facto 
re-subjugation of a race? Again, history shows that the allowance of gov-
ernment endorsed racial superiority will indeed have such an effect. We 
need look no farther than the Jim Crow era to find such evidence.
Under Jim Crow, the Southern States sought to reestablish a system 
by which Blacks would occupy a lower level of society and politics than 
Whites did.111 They enacted laws aimed at perpetuating the segregation of 
the races under the reasoning that allowing an inferior race to intermingle 
with a superior one would have dire results.112 Just as General Schurz had 
warned, allowing the State governments to operate under the philosophy 
of racial superiority was leading to the subjugation of the freed Black 
man.113 Under these new laws, Blacks were banned from exercising basic
rights, such as voting, serving on juries, traveling with Whites, showing 
public affection, or even just lighting the cigarette of a White woman.114
While these laws were eventually struck down under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is clear that the base philosophical element that allowed 
the de facto return to second class citizenship was the belief that the gov-
ernment was justified in viewing the Black man as an inferior race.115
108. 392 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
109. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 29 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It was 
supposed that the eradication of slavery and involuntary servitude of every form and de-
scription required that the slave should be made a citizen and placed on an entire equality 
before the law with the white citizen . . . .”).
110. The elements of which are whether what is being challenged is historically linked 
to the institution of slavery and whether its allowance would lead to a de facto subjuga-
tion of a race. McAward, supra note 68.
111. See A Brief History of Jim Crow, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND (July 18, 2018 
12:34 pm), http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/a-brief-history-of-jim-crow.
112. Id.
113. See THE AM. CIVIL RIGHTS UNION, THE TRUTH ABOUT JIM CROW 3 (2014), 
https://www.theacru.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Truth-About-Jim-Crow.pdf.
114. Id. at 10-11.
115. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Racial superiority was an element of the institution of Ameri-
can slavery. The drafters who sought to end this institution knew 
and acknowledged the subjugating effect of allowing the govern-
ment to endorse the message of racial superiority. History shows 
that the allowance of such an endorsement can, and at points has, 
led to the re-establishment of Blacks as second-class citizens.116
Thus, the governmental endorsement of racial superiority consti-
tutes a badge of slavery and is therefore unconstitutional under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.
III. A Message May be Unconstitutional
Once freedom from a governmentally endorsed message of racial 
superiority is established as a right, the next step is to establish the form of 
injury its infringement would take. When it comes to an injury caused by 
exposure to that particular message, there is no applicable case law or 
statute. Fortunately, there is a parallel history under the First Amend-
ment’s Establishment Clause and its constitutional ban of governmental 
endorsement of any specific religion. In this jurisprudence, the courts 
have held that mere exposure to a symbol of religious preference that car-
ries government endorsement is itself an injury on which standing can be 
based.117 As with racial supremacy, it is the message itself that is being 
barred, not the effect of the message on the treatment of the people,  and 
the injury it produces may be based on this distinction.118
The First Amendment promises the freedom of expression of all 
parties, including the government when it speaks for itself.119 Yet, imme-
diately preceding those words of freedom was written a limitation:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
116. See supra Part II.D.
117. See, e.g., Doe v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding 
standing to challenge the phrase “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency); see also, e.g.
Vasquez v. L.A. Cty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding standing to challenge use of 
a cross in a city seal); see also, e.g. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (find-
ing standing to challenge the public display of a nativity scene); see also, e.g. Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (finding standing to challenge display of Ten Commandments 
on public school grounds).
118. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 258-59 (4th Cir. 
2018), vacated on different grounds, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4049; Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. at 595; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (“The Establish-
ment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of di-
rect governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an 
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals 
or not.”).
119. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757-58 (2017).
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gion . . . .”120 As with the Thirteenth Amendment, the charge of the 
clause of the First Amendment seems clear on its face: the U.S. shall not 
establish a national religion. But, it too has since been read to have a 
much wider scope.121 The Supreme Court has held that the Amendment 
bars the government not only from creating a national religion, but also 
from endorsing the idea that any one religion is superior to another.122
The Founders feared a national church because of the long history 
between the government of England and the Church of England, as well 
as the effect that state sponsored churches were already having on the 
early colonists.123 At the same time, they feared the message that any 
group of people were outsiders due to their religious affiliation and thus
not equal citizens.124 In response to this fear, the Founders sought to en-
sure that the government would be barred from communicating such a 
message,125 either through legislation or a showing of endorsement.126
In other words, the First Amendment bars not only the actual estab-
lishment of a national religion, but also the message that any religion is 
120. U.S. CONST. amend I.
121. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2417 (2018) (“Our cases recognize that the 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot 
be officially preferred over another.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cty. of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 592-93 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)
(“It does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that 
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”) (O’Connor, J. concur-
ring); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“In the absence of precisely 
stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main 
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: sponsor-
ship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id.
123. See John P. Kaminski, Religion and the Founding Fathers, ANNOTATION, (Nat’l His-
torical Publ’ns and Records Comm’n, D.C.), Mar. 2002, at 1.
124. E.g. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2434 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“Consistent with that clear command, this Court has long acknowledged that govern-
mental actions that favor one religion ‘inevitabl[y]’ foster ‘the hatred, disrespect and even 
contempt of those who [hold] contrary beliefs.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612-13.
125. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“As we 
have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight 
times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has 
consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief 
or the expression thereof.”) (emphasis added).
126. See Walz v. Tax Com. of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (“The sweep of the ab-
solute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the purpose 
was to state an objective, not to write a statute.”); Doe v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 
578 (6th Cir. 2018).
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endorsed by the government. This was done because it was feared that 
the allowance of such an expression would hinder the constitutional right
of a citizen to be free of the government’s establishment of a religion.127
In the same light, when the Thirteenth Amendment barred the badges of 
slavery, it barred anything that would lead to the hindrance of the consti-
tutional right to be free of all elements of slavery based on a person’s 
race.128 This includes the government endorsement of racial superiority.
As under the Establishment Clause, it is the message itself that is barred.
The bar on endorsement has not been limited to direct statements 
or actions.129 When the government has endorsed religion through sym-
bology, such as allowing prayer in school,130 the displaying of paintings of 
Jesus,131 and the offering of religious symbols such as crosses and the Ten 
Commandments,132 the courts have repeatedly found the endorsement to 
be in violation of the Constitution.133 Since the message itself is barred, 
any method by which the government may be interpreted as promoting 
that message is likewise unconstitutional.
IV. Symbology and Article III Standing
A. Mere Exposure to a Constitutionally Barred Symbol is a 
Recognized Injury in Fact
In order to determine if a right has been invaded to the extent nec-
essary to qualify as an injury for the purpose of Article III standing, stand-
ards can be set reflecting the particular kind of injury that such an inva-
127. See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590-94; see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 
221.
128. See Or. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128-29 (1970); see also Hodges v. U.S., 203 
U.S. 1, 26-27 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(“The Clause ‘forbids subtle departures from neutrality,’ and ‘covert suppression of par-
ticular religious beliefs.’ Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treat-
ment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”)
(citations omitted).
130. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 232; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
131. See Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir. 1994).
132. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (displaying of the Ten Com-
mandments in a school); see also Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 573-74
(1989) (displaying a nativity scene on government property).
133. See Washegesic, 33 F.3d at 684; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 232; 
Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
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sion would create.134 While there has been no direct holding on the 
standards for exposure to a symbol of racial supremacy, analogous conclu-
sions from the Establishment Clause can be drawn. 
An invasion of the Establishment Clause requires only an exposure 
to the message, nothing more.135 It is not required that the people hearing 
the endorsement be compelled or coerced or show any other effect; it is 
enough that they were exposed to a message that the government was 
not allowed to convey.136 The exposure creates the harm by fostering 
“the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary 
beliefs.”137 Since the interest protected under the Establishment Clause is 
of a spiritual, rather than economic or physical in nature, then an injury 
to the spirit beyond mere offense may be deemed a concrete injury for 
the purposes of standing.138 Though mere exposure is not commonly 
considered a tangible harm, ultimately, it is the right to be free of the 
message and its possible effect on one’s spirit that is protected. Exposure 
is the unique harm the violation of that right creates. Since this harm is of 
such a similar nature to the harm of a government-endorsed message of 
racial superiority, it is logical to apply the same standard to both.139
One of the original intentions of the Thirteenth Amendment was to 
ban the badges of slavery, including the government endorsement of the 
message of racial superiority.140 This is an absolute right created by the 
134. See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968) (“However, our decisions 
establish that, in ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the 
substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical 
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. For example, 
standing requirements will vary in First Amendment religion cases depending upon 
whether the party raises an Establishment Clause claim or a claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause.”); Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 605 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“While the plaintiffs are not exempt from the basic constitutional requirement that they 
be injured and thus have a concrete stake in the dispute, we have nonetheless recognized 
that standing principles must be ‘tailored to reflect the kind of injuries Establishment 
Clause plaintiffs are likely to suffer.’”); Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (“Nonetheless the standing inquiry in Establishment Clause cases has been tai-
lored to reflect the kind of injuries Establishment Clause plaintiffs are likely to suffer. . . .
rules of standing recognize that noneconomic or intangible injury may suffice to make an 
Establishment Clause claim justiciable.”).
135. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963).
136. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S. at 221.
137. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431; see also Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
138. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 819-20 (7th Cir. 
2014).
139. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (Bradley, J.) (“Security for civil 
rights must be the same as that for religious rights.”).
140. See supra. Part II.E.
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Constitution, thus its abridgment alone is enough to constitute an inju-
ry.141 Since the injury prevented spiritual in nature, exposure may be con-
sidered the unique harm that results from the abridgement. In the end, it 
is the message that people are protected against, not its effect on them.
Mere exposure to such a message constitutes a concrete harm to the ab-
solute right to be free of that message and therefore, meets the standing 
requirements of Article III.
B. Test for Whether Exposure to a Particular Symbol of Racial Superiority Is 
Sufficient to Provide Article III Standing
Of course, it is not correct to say that exposure alone, viewed in a 
vacuum, is always an injury in fact. Such a broad allowance for standing 
has been widely denounced by the courts.142 In Allen, Justice O’Connor 
voiced a concern that granting standing for such a broad style of injury
would allow almost anyone in the country to challenge almost anything 
anywhere, something that was never intended by the Constitution.143
Fortunately, though the recognition of the injury of exposure to a sym-
bol of racial superiority would be new, there is precedent to be found in 
Establishment Clause cases that would limit its allowance and create a 
workable test. While the Supreme Court has not provided a test or series 
of requirements regarding standing specifically for religious symbol expo-
sure, the lower courts have created a workable model that can easily be 
applied to symbols of racial supremacy.144 Specifically, it can be shown 
that a plaintiff has standing to bring an action into federal court if they 
can show that they are a member of a community whose government has 
offered a symbol of racial supremacy meant to communicate that in the 
eyes of the government, the plaintiff is a second class citizen due to their 
race.
The first element, and most limiting, is that the party bringing the 
action must belong to the governmental community that is offering the 
message. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church & State, the Court held that the parties did not have standing to 
challenge the transfer of property from the government to a church relat-
ed college because the plaintiffs did not belong to the affected communi-
ty; they were merely aware of the action.145 A party cannot bring a gen-
141. Id.
142. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
143. Id. at 755-56.
144. See infra Part IV.B.
145. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & St., 454 
U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
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eral grievance simply because they see that the government is not follow-
ing the Constitution.146 In dealing with religious symbols, the lower 
courts strongly integrated the Valley Forge holding by requiring that the 
parties be from the community offering the symbol.147 In the same way, it 
would not be enough for a plaintiff to merely have been exposed to a 
symbol of racial superiority; they must be a member of the community 
whose government endorsed such a message in order for them to have 
standing to challenge it.
Secondly, for an injury to provide Article III standing, it is also re-
quired that the plaintiff show they are amongst the people who have 
been injured.148 It is not enough to be a caring citizen or to be personally 
offended at the actions of one’s own community; the accused action must 
directly injure the plaintiff.149 This requirement may be more difficult to 
satisfy when challenging a symbol under the Thirteenth Amendment as 
opposed to the First. Since the Establishment Clause provides a general 
right to all citizens, it is hard to imagine a plaintiff from the offering 
community who cannot claim they were amongst the injured parties. If 
the government endorses Catholicism, the right of Catholics to be free 
from religious endorsement is as infringed as a Jewish citizen’s would be.
For the Thirteenth Amendment to apply, it would require a show-
ing that the person was of the race being targeted as inferior. For exam-
ple, a White citizen of a community offering a symbol of white suprema-
cy would not have been personally injured, despite being a member of 
the offering community, because his personal status is not affected. His 
right to not be viewed as a second-class citizen by his government has 
not been infringed. It is necessary for a plaintiff to show that they are of 
the group whom the message is targeting as inferior for them to claim 
that they have been personally injured by the particular endorsement.
146. Id.
147. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 261 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(“[M]ere awareness of religious animus, without more, is insufficient.”); Freedom from 
Religion Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“A passerby who is not a member of the community, and who faces no risk of fu-
ture contact, may not have an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. This is because 
standing requires that the plaintiff has a concrete grievance that is particularized to him 
and that the plaintiff is not one simply expressing generalized disagreement with activities 
in a place in which he has no connection.”).
148. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
149. Id., see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962) (“The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to 
invoke the court’s jurisdiction have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of is-
sues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions.”).
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While some courts have held that there must be some effect from 
the exposure (generally that the plaintiff have changed some of their ac-
tivities in response150), a majority of courts have held that the exposure is 
the harm and nothing further is required to establish standing.151 In addi-
tion, the number of exposures or possible exposures is inconsequential; it 
is enough that an exposure occurred.152 The size of the population ulti-
mately harmed and whether the symbol was seen by a large number of 
people is unimportant.153
Finally, it must be shown that the message is in fact government 
speech promoting racial superiority. While the Courts have not been en-
tirely clear on the relationship between the First Amendment, Thirteenth 
Amendment, and private actions, there has never been a question about 
their relationship to the government.154 Since what is barred is endorse-
ment by the government, the plaintiff must show that what they are chal-
lenging is in fact an endorsement of racial superiority by the government. 
This is not as easy of a question as it sounds on the surface.
In the very split decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the majority, the 
concurrence, and the dissent agreed that the purpose of a religious sym-
bol must be analyzed not just by its facial meaning, but also by its histori-
cal and physical context to determine whether it was a message of en-
dorsement.155 While the issue there was whether subsidizing teachers at a 
150. See, e.g., Vasquez v. L.A. Cty., 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., Harris 
v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Foremaster v. City of St. George,
882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989).
151. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. 
Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 476-9 (3d Cir. 2016) (Shwartz, J.) (“Nearly every court of appeals 
has held that standing in this context requires only direct and unwelcome personal contact 
with the alleged establishment of religion . . . While altering one’s behavior to avoid 
something may demonstrate that the thing avoided is unwelcome, altered conduct is not a 
prerequisite for obtaining standing in this context.”) (internal citations removed). See also
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (Noting that the lower courts had found standing 
despite there being no change in the activities of the plaintiff); Robinson v. City of Ed-
mond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1201 (1996); see e.g. Murray 
v. City. of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991), rehearing denied, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
29558 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); see e.g. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 
827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
152. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 
F.3d at 478 (“frequent contact with a display is not a requirement for standing . . . .”).
153. See Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“Though the portrait, like school prayers and other sectarian religious rituals and sym-
bols, may seem ‘de minimis’ to the great majority, particularly those raised in the Chris-
tian faith and those who do not care about religion, a few see it as a governmental state-
ment favoring one religious group and downplaying others. It is the rights of these few 
that the Establishment Clause protects in this case.”).
154. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
155. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religious school constituted endorsement, the same opinion has been ap-
plied to such seemingly obvious symbols as a cross,156 a menorah,157 and a
nativity scene.158 In all of these cases, the plaintiff was required to demon-
strate that the symbol – taking into account not only its facial and subjec-
tive meaning but also its history and the method of its display – was of-
fered by the government for the purpose of religious endorsement in 
order to gain standing to challenge it.159
In the same vein, a plaintiff making a claim against a symbol under 
the Thirteenth Amendment must take into account meaning as well as 
historical and physical context to show that it is being offered by the 
government for the purpose of endorsing racial supremacy. This re-
quirement functions as much as a safeguard as it does a gate. Staying with 
the example of Moore, if the courts had determined that the Confederate 
Battle Flag as offered within the Mississippi State flag communicated a 
message of racial supremacy, that would not mean that the State could 
not display the Confederate Battle Flag or the old State flag in places 
where historical context warrants it, such as a historical battlefield. In 
such a context, the symbol – though arguably a promotion of racial su-
premacy in nature – is not functioning as an advancement of the message
but instead as a historical reference and would not be barred by the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
Using this long history of rulings as a guide, it is simple to deter-
mine whether a particular exposure to a symbol of racial superiority 
should be considered an injury for the purposes of standing. The plaintiff 
must be able to make some factual allegation that the challenged symbol 
is being offered by the government for the purpose of endorsing racial 
supremacy, and that that offering creates the concrete harm. The plaintiff 
must be a member of the community offering the symbol and must be of 
the race being promoted as inferior. While they must demonstrate expo-
sure, they need not show that the exposure was frequent, that it altered 
their activities, or that it created any other effect or influence. So long as 
these elements are met, the plaintiff should not be refused his opportunity 
to be heard by the courts.
156. See e.g., Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
157. See e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 380 (9th Cir. 
1996).
158. See e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 122 (7th Cir. 1987).
159. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that the relevant ques-
tion was not whether the symbol offered was a religious one, but whether the symbol, 
analyzed in context, could be said to be functioning as an advancement of a particular re-
ligion); see also Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d at 131.
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V. Conclusion
. . . [T]here is an impulse to decide difficult questions of sub-
stantive law obliquely in the course of opinions purporting to 
do nothing more than determine what the Court labels 
“standing”; this accounts for the phenomenon of opinions, 
such as the one today, that tend merely to obfuscate, rather 
than inform, our understanding of the meaning of rights under 
the law. The serious by-product of that practice is that the 
Court disregards its constitutional responsibility when, by fail-
ing to acknowledge the protections afforded by the Constitu-
tion, it uses “standing to slam the courthouse door against 
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims 
on the merits.” The opinion of the Court is a stark example of 
this unfortunate trend of resolving cases at the “threshold”
while obscuring the nature of the underlying rights and inter-
ests at stake.160
Justice Brennan penned these scolding words in dissent to the denial of 
standing in Valley Forge.161 He criticized the actions of a Court that, by his 
accusation, was not afraid to invoke standing to dodge a ruling on the 
merits of the issue.162 While not every denial of standing is such, in the 
case of Carlos Moore it very much seems to be so. By refusing to hear his 
case, the Supreme Court has shut the door on a controversial issue that is 
growing in national importance.163
More and more, symbols such as flags, statues, and memorials are 
being challenged for their perceived message of racial supremacy. Those 
challenges have grown to the point of violence in the streets, as was re-
160. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & St., 454 
U.S. 464, 490-91 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 
159, 178 (1970)).
161. Id. at 490.
162. Id.
163. See Logan Strother, Spencer Piston & Thomas Ogorzalek, Are Confederate Monu-
ments Our Heritage or Symbols of Hate?, NEWSWEEK (July 17, 2018, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/are-confederate-monuments-our-heritage-or-symbols-
hate-633678; see also David Lohr, Debate Over Confederate Emblem In Mississippi Flag Heats 
Up In Charlottesville’s Wake, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2018, 3:39 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/confederate-flag-mississippi-state-
charlottsveille_us_59930a84e4b08a247277809e; see also Jessica Taylor, The Complicated 
Political History Of The Confederate Flag, NPR (July 17, 2018, 3:48 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/22/416548613/the-complicated-
political-history-of-the-confederate-flag.
FALL 2019] Symbolism and the Thirteenth Amendment 107
cently seen at the 2017 Charlottesville protests.164 At the center of this
public debate is the question of whether such symbols should be allowed 
to exist at all, much less carry any form of governmental endorsement.
Courts have understandably been reluctant to hold such a hot potato, us-
ing the excuse of standing to keep such questions outside the courthouse. 
Unfortunately, in doing so, they are ignoring a charge of the Constitu-
tion itself.
From its creation, the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to do 
more than simply free the then-existing slaves.165 It was intended to eradi-
cate the institution of slavery from the American landscape, and provide 
an equal citizenship status to all races.166 This meant not only breaking the 
bonds of servitude, but also removing all elements that caused slavery or 
could enable its return.167 To accomplish this, it is essential that the gov-
ernment not be able to convey the message that any race of citizen is in-
ferior to another. The right to be free of such an attack is implicit in the 
freedom provided by the Amendment.168
A U.S. citizen has a right to not be told by their government, at any 
level, that they are not deserving of the full rights of any other citizen.169
Since this is an absolute right, any infringement results in an injury re-
gardless of whether it is accompanied by a further action or not.170 The 
message need not be a direct statement or statute, it is barred no matter 
what form it takes, even that of symbology.171 Since the harm can be 
connected to a government action – such as endorsement – and a court 
order will relieve the harm, it is proper that a remedy be sought through 
the courts.172
This is not a novel or unique approach to such a problem. Just as 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, the First Amendment equally creates 
an absolute right to be free from a specific message: governmental en-
dorsement of a particular religion.173 There it has been accepted that a 
mere one time exposure to such a message, even in the form of a simple 
religious symbol, is enough to unjustly infringe a citizen’s right, even 
164. See Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (July 
17, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-
protest-statue.html.
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. See supra Part II.E.
167. See supra Part II.C.
168. See supra Part III.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra Part IV.A.
172. See Dep’t Of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019).
173. See supra pp. 96-99.
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though no economic or physical harm existed.174 To ensure such protec-
tion, a formula was created to show standing and allow the wronged to 
have their day in court.175
Such a standard is equally applicable to the harm of exposure to a 
message of racial supremacy. Though no physical or economic harm may 
be inflicted by such an expression, it still represents an injury to an abso-
lute right and therefore, must be capable of being argued in court.176 This 
is not a call for the floodgates to open. The plaintiff must still be able to 
show they were personally harmed by the message by offering a factual 
allegation that it is a message of racial superiority, that it carries govern-
ment endorsement, that they are a member of the community offering 
the symbol, and that they are themselves a member of the race being 
promoted as inferior.177
The need for standing in these types of cases goes beyond a mere 
desire to create a theoretical interpretation of a one-hundred and fifty-
aught year-old amendment and its satellite issues. One need not stretch 
their minds to find the intrinsic harm in a city passing a resolution that 
the White race is supreme to all others or erecting a statute celebrating 
the teachings of William J. Simmons. Despite their personal agreement 
that such symbols should not be allowed, the courts will simply throw up 
their hands and say there is nothing they can do. Nothing can be done to 
remove such symbols unless the plaintiff can point to a specific, physical 
harm or mistreatment resulting from the symbol’s existence. According 
to the courts, simply being told by your government that you are of an 
inferior race is not enough.178 These courts have errored in their analysis. 
While they are right in saying that the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which promises equal treatment, has not been violated, what they have 
failed at is recognizing the promise of equal citizenship required by the 
Thirteenth. The courts failed in seeing that the nation was driven into its 
bloodiest conflict due as much to an idea as an action.  That the Consti-
tution was amended to demand that the people have a method by which 
they may challenge and remove such a philosophy.
What is not being argued in this writing is that specific symbols of 
Southern heritage, including the Confederate Battle Flag, are absolutely a 
promotion of racial superiority and therefore should be taken down and 
banned. There is still a lot of muddy water to wade through in order to 
get to an ultimate decision: issues of historical context and the extent to 
which it can immunize a message; at what point private speech becomes 
174. See supra note 171.
175. See supra Part IV.B.
176. See supra Part II.E.
177. See supra Part IV.B.
178. See Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2017).
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government speech; whether a vote can turn government speech into 
private speech; and, ultimately, what message is being conveyed must still 
be addressed. However, the fact that such heated and controversial issues 
lay ahead is no reason for the courts to refuse to enter the fray. In fact, as 
the debate gets more and more intense it has arguably become the duty 
of the court to give the parties on both sides the proper forum they de-
serve to be heard and to determine whether either side is losing their 
constitutional protection. Article III must not be invoked for the purpose 
of avoiding the difficult constitutional issues that are within that debate. 
For, as Brennan argued, “[t]o construe that Article to deny standing to 
the class for whose sake constitutional protection is given simply turns the 
Constitution on its head. Article III was designed to provide a hospitable 
forum in which persons enjoying rights under the Constitution could as-
sert those rights.”179 This includes the right to free expression, but it also 
includes the right to be free from all government-endorsed symbols of 
racial superiority.
179. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 493-94 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

